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ABSTRACT
As machine learning becomes a practice and commodity, nu-
merous cloud-based services and frameworks are provided to
help customers develop and deploy machine learning appli-
cations. While it is prevalent to outsource model training
and serving tasks in the cloud, it is important to protect
the privacy of sensitive samples in the training dataset and
prevent information leakage to untrusted third parties. Past
work have shown that a malicious machine learning service
provider or end user can easily extract critical information
about the training samples, from the model parameters or
even just model outputs.
In this paper, we propose a novel and generic methodology
to preserve the privacy of training data in machine learning
applications. Specifically we introduce a obfuscate func-
tion and apply it to the training data before feeding them to
the model training task. This function adds random noise
to existing samples, or augments the dataset with new sam-
ples. By doing so sensitive information about the properties
of individual samples, or statistical properties of a group of
samples, is hidden. Meanwhile the model trained from the
obfuscated dataset can still achieve high accuracy. With this
approach, the customers can safely disclose the data or mod-
els to third-party providers or end users without the need to
worry about data privacy. Our experiments show that this
approach can effective defeat four existing types of machine
learning privacy attacks at negligible accuracy cost.
1. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays machine learning has become a core component
of many popular applications, such as image classification,
speech recognition, natural language translation. To sup-
port the increased demand of machine learning-based devel-
opment, many cloud providers push Machine Learning as a
Service (MLaaS), providing computing platforms and learn-
ing frameworks for machine learning model training and
serving. Typical MLaaS platforms include Amazon Sage-
maker [1], Google Cloud ML Engine [2], Microsoft Azure ML
Studio [3]. To use the MLaaS, customers provide training
dataset and (or) machine learning algorithms to the cloud
provider. The cloud provider sets up the machine learn-
ing environment, allocates certain amount of computation
resources, and runs the model training task automatically.
The cloud provider can also offer the model serving services,
in which a model trained in the cloud side or the customer
side is stored in the cloud platform. The cloud provider re-
leases query APIs to end users, enabling them to use the
model for prediction or classification.
A training dataset is necessary to train and generate a
machine learning model. A dataset can contain sensitive
samples, e.g., personal medical records, employee informa-
tion, financial data, etc. How to protect the privacy of
such samples has become a new security concern in ma-
chine learning. This privacy threat is especially serious in
Machine Learning as a Service. First, in a model training
service, customers need to upload the training data to the
cloud provider, and the provider has full access to the data.
Past work have shown that a malicious provider can eas-
ily steal the sensitive data, embed them into the model for
leakage [34]. Second, in a model serving service, customers
need to upload the pre-trained models to the cloud provider
and set up end points for remote users to use the models.
A successful machine learning model incorporates essential
information about the training set. So even if the malicious
provider does not have direct access to the dataset, he can
extract sensitive information about the training data from
the model parameters [5, 16, 24]. Third, even if the cloud
provider is trusted, a malicious remote user who has only
black-box access to the model output results is still able to
retrieve information about the training data by querying the
model with carefully-crafted inputs [9,10,14,21,22,30,33,38].
Protecting the privacy of training data in machine learn-
ing is challenging. First, when customers outsource machine
learning tasks to the MLaaS provider, they have to grant the
service provider full accesses to the data or models. This
inevitably causes a big attack surface. Second, a correct
machine learning model must reveal information about the
data on which it was trained. This creates opportunities for
an adversary to learn information from the models. Third,
given a fact that the adversary can steal different properties
of the sensitive samples from different sources in different
scenarios, it is very hard to have a generic method to elimi-
nate all these information leakage.
Some solutions were proposed to achieve privacy-preserving
machine learning. These solutions can be classified into two
categories. The first category is to design privacy-aware ma-
chine learning algorithms [4, 32] and platforms [17, 26] to
prevent information leakage from models. However, this as-
sumes that these security schemes can be correctly deployed
in MLaaS. A malicious cloud provider with full control of
machine learning tasks and platforms can easily subvert such
privacy protection by disabling these solutions. Besides, in
a model training service, customers are required to disclose
the dataset to the cloud provider. These security-aware algo-
rithms or platforms cannot prevent training data leakage in
this scenario. The second category is to process the training
ar
X
iv
:1
80
7.
01
86
0v
2 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
3 J
ul 
20
18
data before releasing them to untrusted third parties. For
instance, homomorphic encryption is introduced to process
the training samples and then models are trained over the
encrypted data [6] . While this can prevent data leakage, ho-
momorphic encryption is not generic for arbitrary machine
learning algorithms and the performance is not efficient.
In this paper, we propose a novel and generic methodol-
ogy to protect the privacy of training data in MLaaS. Our
method follows the second defense category described above:
training data processing. Specifically, we introduce a new
function Obfuscate to help hide the sensitive information by
adding random noise to the training dataset. We consider
two cases: for the attacks that attempt to steal the prop-
erties of individual samples, we add random noise to these
sensitive samples; for the attacks that attempt to learn the
statistical properties of groups of samples, we augment the
dataset with faked noisy samples. These noise are injected
to obfuscate the adversary’s observations, while maintain-
ing the prediction accuracy of trained models. Customers
who are concerned with their sensitive data can apply this
function to the training dataset and then disclose them to
the MLaaS provider. So even the untrusted service provider
or remote end users have access to the training data, model
parameters or model outputs, they cannot discover the sen-
sitive information hidden by the Obfuscate operation. Our
evaluation indicates that this methodology can eliminate the
leakage of four different types of privacy attacks [5,9,33,34].
This function introduces negligible performance overhead
and accuracy reduction (< 5%).
The key contributions of this paper are:
• a comprehensive analysis of privacy attacks in machine
learning services.
• a generic method of obfuscating training dataset to elim-
inate data leakage.
• evaluation of data obfuscation to defeat different types of
machine learning privacy attacks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Sec. 2 gives
the background of machine learning and model privacy at-
tacks. Sec. 3 describes the methodology of obfuscating indi-
vidual or group of samples to hide information. Sec. 4 shows
the application of this methodology in different case studies.
We discuss related work in Sec. 5 and conclude in Sec. 6.
2. BACKGROUND
2.1 Machine Learning
A supervised machine learning model is a parameterized
function fθ : X 7→ Y that maps input data x ∈ X (feature)
to output data y ∈ Y (label). For a classification problem,
X is a d-dimensional vector space and Y is a discrete set of
classes. This function is able to accurately predict the label
of new data that have not seen before.
Model training. The training process of a machine learn-
ing model is to find the optimal parameters θ that can accu-
rately reflect the relationship between X and Y. To achieve
this, a training dataset D = {xi, yi}Ni=1 with N samples is
needed, where xi ∈ X is the feature data and yi ∈ Y is the
corresponding ground-truth label. Then a loss function L is
adopted to measure the distance between the ground-truth
output yi and the predicted output fθ(xi). Ω is a regular-
ization term that penalizes model complexity and help avoid
overfitting. The goal of training a model is to minimize this
loss function (Equation 1).
θ∗ = arg min
θ
(
N∑
i=1
L(yi, fθ(xi) + Ω(θ)) (1)
Model inference. After the model training is completed
and the optimal parameters θ∗ are obtained, given an input
x, the corresponding output can be calculated as y = fθ∗(x).
This prediction process is called inference. We can also cal-
culate the prediction accuracy of the model over a testing
dataset Dt = {xti, yti}Mi=1 to measure the model’s perfor-
mance. For a classification problem where the output is a
discrete number of values, the prediction accuracy is defined
in Equation 2, where I is the indicator function.
acc(Dt, fθ∗) =
1
M
M∑
i=1
I(fθ∗(xti) = yti) (2)
Deep learning. The past few years have witnessed the
fast development in deep learning, a new branch of machine
learning. Algorithmic breakthroughs, the feasibility of data
collection, and increasing computational power have con-
tributed to the popularity of deep learning techniques. Deep
learning have been widely adopted in many artificial intel-
lectual applications, such as image recognition [15], natural
language processing [23], speech recognition [13], etc..
A deep learning model is usually in the form of a neural
network. Various neural network architectures have been
proposed for different applications, e.g. multilayer percep-
trons [28], convolutional neural networks [19] and recurrent
neural networks [29]. A neural network consists of an in-
put layer, an output layer and a sequence of hidden layers
between the input and output. Each layer is a collection of
units called neurons, which are connected to other neurons in
the previous layer and the following layer. Each connection
between the neurons can transmit a signal to another neu-
ron in the next layer by applying a linear function followed
by an element-wise nonlinear activation function (e.g. sig-
moid or ReLU). In this way, a neural network transforms the
inputs through hidden layers and then the outputs. Back-
ward propagation [11] and stochastic gradient descent [27]
are commonly used methods to train a deep learning model
and find the optimal parameters.
2.2 Privacy Threats in MLaaS
Cloud-based machine learning services are released to pro-
vide automated solutions for machine learning data process-
ing, model training, inference and further deployment. They
attract machine learning practitioners to deploy applications
in the cloud without having to set up their own large-scale
infrastructure and computation resources.
There are two main types of machine learning services in
the cloud (Figure 1). The first one is model training: the
cloud provider offers the computing resources and the cus-
tomer selects a machine learning algorithm. Then the ML
algorithm runs on the computing resources and generates
the model for the customer. The second one is model serv-
ing: the customer uploads a model to the cloud platform.
The cloud platform releases query APIs to end users. Then
the end users can use the ML model for prediction or classifi-
cation via these query APIs. A cloud platform can offer both
Customer
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Figure 1: Data leakage in MLaaS.
the model training and model serving services to customers
to achieve end-to-end machine learning deployment.
Recent work proposed privacy attacks in MLaaS: a ma-
licious cloud provider or end user can extract sensitive in-
formation about the training dataset from machine learning
tasks running in the cloud. We summarize these attacks
based on the leaked information sources and types.
2.2.1 Leaked information sources.
In different service modes, an adversary can steal sensitive
information from different sources.
Training set. Generating a model requires the training
data and code. In the model training service (Figure 1a),
customers do not necessarily need to upload the training
code as they can select default ones from the cloud provider.
However, training data is a necessity from customers to gen-
erate the models that are applicable to customers’ scenarios.
So the cloud provider has full access to the training data D.
If the cloud provider is malicious, he can retrieve arbitrary
information directly from the training set. Song et al. [34]
designed a ML model memorization attack based on this
threat model: the adversary can steal the critical training
data and encode them into the trained model in different
ways. So another adversary is able to retrieve the training
data from the model parameters if he has white-box access
to the model, or from the model outputs if he only has black-
box access to the model.
Model parameters. In the model serving service (Figure
1b), the cloud provider may not have access to the train-
ing set if the model is not trained in the cloud. However
he has access to the trained model fθ and is able to iden-
tify the model algorithm, neural network topology, model
parameters and hyper-parameters. Since the model fθ is
generated over the training D (Equation 1), the model pa-
rameters θ reveal some information about the training set.
A malicious cloud provider is able to steal some informa-
tion from the model parameters. For instance, Ateniese et
al. [5] demonstrated a machine learning attack, that uses
model parameters as features to classify and identify some
sensitive properties about the training dataset.
In the model training service, model parameters can also
leak information. This case happens in distributed machine
learning, where multiple nodes collaborate to train a ma-
chine learning model and each node uses its own training
dataset. As every node needs to keep synchronizing the
model parameters with other nodes. A malicious node can
infer the training dataset of other nodes from the shared
model parameters. Membership inference attack [24] and
model inversion attack [16] have been demonstrated in this
setting and threat model.
Model output. In the model serving scenario (Figure 1b),
in addition to the cloud provider who has white-box access
to the model, an end user with black-box access to the model
also has chances to retrieve training set properties only from
the model outputs. Basically end users are allowed to use
the model for prediction or classification. They send a sam-
ple to the cloud provider and receive the corresponding pre-
diction result for this sample. The idea here is that the
training data can affect the model parameters, which can
then affect the prediction results of specific samples. Then
an untrusted end user can send carefully-crafted input to the
model and use the output to learn about the training data.
For instance, in model inversion attacks [9, 10], the adver-
sary attempts to reconstruct the training sample from the
output confidence score. The attack strategy is to find the
optimized sample whose confidence score is most close to 1
for one specific class. In membership inference attacks [33],
the adversary uses the output confidence score of some sam-
ples as the training data to build a classify and predict if
one target training sample is a member of the training set
used for training this model.
2.2.2 Leaked information types.
The adversary can extract different types of properties
about the training set D = {xi, yi}Ni=1, as described below.
Individual samples. An adversary may be interested in
some specific training samples (xi∗ , yi∗) inside the training
set, and want to obtain the properties of these samples, de-
noted as P(xi∗ , yi∗).
For instance, the adversary wants to fully recover the sen-
sitive training samples. In this case, the sensitive property
is the sample values, i.e., P(xi∗ , yi∗) = xi∗ . Past work have
shown that the adversary is able to steal the sensitive med-
ical records in pharmacogenetic models via model inversion
attacks [10] or images in image classification models [34].
Another example is membership inference attack, where
the adversary wants to infer if one sample is used during
the model training phase. Then the property is denoted
as P(xi∗ , yi∗) = I(xi∗ , yi∗ ∈ D). Shokri et al. [33] demon-
strated the possibility of membership inference attacks in
different machine learning models, e.g., image classification,
purchase recommendation, medical procedure prediction.
Groups of samples. Instead of one individual sample, the
adversary may be interested in a group of samples g∗. In
this group, each sample (xi, yi) ∈ g∗ has the same feature
F . The adversary wants to learn the statistical properties
of these samples, denoted as P(g∗).
One typical example is model inversion attack [9]. In a
face recognition system, the adversary wants to reconstruct
the looking of one person (i.e., one class). In this case,
the adversary considers a group of samples within the same
class: F : yi = y∗. The property he wants to obtain is the
average value of the samples in this group: P(g∗) = avg(xi).
This attack is effective at the datasets that samples within
each class is very similar.
A similar attack is demonstrated in [5], where the adver-
sary can extract the nationalities of samples in the speech
recognition system, and the traffic source website in the traf-
fic analyzer. Here the adversary considers all the samples
in the dataset: F : xi, yi ∈ D, i.e., g∗ = D. The prop-
erties in consideration are some attributes of the samples,
P(g∗) = attr(xi). These properties can be recovered from
model parameters.
3. METHODOLOGY
Threat model. We consider three attack settings in two
machine learning service modes, as shown in Figure 1. In the
first case, the adversary is the cloud provider in the model
training mode (Figure 1a). The customers upload the train-
ing data to the adversary. So the adversary has direct access
to all the training data. In the second case, the adversary
is also the cloud provider in the model serving mode (Fig-
ure 1b). The customers upload the model to the adversary.
So he has white-box access to the target model: i.e., he is
able to access the model parameters (e.g., network weights),
hyper-parameters (e.g., regularization parameters, number
of training epochs), model architecture. In the third case,
the adversary is a remote end user in the model serving mode
(Figure 1b). He only has black-box access to the model: i.e.,
he can only make queries to the target model and get the
prediction results, e.g., the confident score of each class for
a given input in a classification model.
Challenges. It is very challenging to design a method to
protect the privacy of training data in MLaaS. First, the
features of ML and MLaaS make it hard to eliminate in-
formation leakage to third parties. For model training, the
customers must disclose the data to the cloud provider to
run the training task. For model serving, the customers
must allow the cloud provider to access the model param-
eters, and the end users to obtain the model outputs. The
parameters and outputs of a correct ML model inevitably
reflect the training data.
Second, the adversary in our threat model is very powerful
and it is difficult to have a generic method to cover all attack
settings. Past work proposed new algorithms or systems to
preserve the training data privacy [4, 26, 32]. These work
all assume that the desired algorithms and systems are cor-
rectly implemented and deployed in MLaaS. For the threat
model in which the adversary has full control of the training
dataset and model training process, enhancing the training
algorithms or environment is not enough to guarantee the
privacy of training data.
Third, there are different types of properties about the
training set (Sec. 2.2.2), and considering all theses properties
is challenging. For instance, collaborative machine learning
with differential privacy was proposed to protect the pri-
vacy of training data [32]. However, it has been proven that
this method can only protect the properties of individual
samples, but not the statistical properties of groups of sam-
ples [16,24]. Similarly, Triastcyn and Faltings [36] proposed
to use GAN to generate artificial dataset to replace the orig-
inal dataset for privacy-aware model training. However, the
artificial dataset still keeps the statistical properties of orig-
inal dataset, as the discriminator network in GAN cannot
distinguish the artificial dataset from the original one.
Overview. We aim to design a methodology to protect the
privacy of training dataset in MLaaS. Our goal is to elim-
inate the leakage of properties of both individual samples
as well as groups of samples, even the adversary (malicious
cloud provider or end users) can access the training dataset,
model parameters or model outputs.
Instead of designing new algorithms or systems, we pro-
pose to process the training data D and convert it to D′
before outsourcing them into the machine learning services.
This data processing needs to meet two goals:
• R1: there are no confidential information about critical
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Figure 2: Methodology Overview
individual or groups of samples embedded in D′ or the
model trained from such data. So the adversary with
access to D′, the model or the query outputs cannot get
useful information.
• R2: The model trained from the new dataset D′ should
have negligible prediction accuracy decrease compared to
the one trained from the original dataset D.
Figure 2 shows the overview of our methodology. We add a
new module, Obfuscate Module at the customer’s side to
process the training data. This module obfuscates the train-
ing dataset, to hide critical information. With this design
we do not need to make any assumptions or requirements for
the untrusted third parties. We consider the privacy of indi-
vidual properties as well as group statistical properties. To
hide individual properties, we add random noise to sensitive
samples. To hide group statistical properties, we augment
the dataset with new faked samples. Below we describe the
obfuscation mechanisms to achieve the two goals.
3.1 Obfuscating Individual Samples
3.1.1 Mechanism
We first consider the protection of individual samples.
Given a dataset D = {xi, yi}Ni=1, there are some sensitive
samples that customers do not want to disclose to third par-
ties. We denote the set of these samples as d∗ ⊆ D. Note
that the samples inside this set do not need to have common
features. This is different from the groups of samples dis-
cussed in Sec. 3.2. For each sensitive sample (x∗, y∗) ∈ d∗,
the adversary is interested to learn the property P(x∗, y∗).
The Obfuscate Module takes these sensitive samples
as input, and converts them to new samples. Algorithm 1
shows the pseudo code of this module. The ObfuscateIn-
dividualSample function inside this module is applied to
obfuscate each sensitive sample. The basic idea is to add
noise to these samples, so the adversary will not learn the
property from the converted new samples. Meanwhile, the
added noise will not affect the model accuracy.
There are different ways to add noise. Generically, for the
input vector xi∗ , we can randomly select part of the feature
values (with the ratio of r) and add Gaussian noise N (0, σ)
to these values. Requirements R1 and R2 can be achieved
by adjusting the parameters r and σ. A more sophisticated
way is to identify the sensitive features in each input and
only add Gaussian noise N (0, σ) to these feature values. For
instance, in a face recognition model, we can only obscure
the faces of sensitive training images. For a medical machine
learning model, we can add noise to the critical features, e.g.,
age or occupation, of the sensitive patients.
3.1.2 Analysis
When adding noise to individual samples, there is a trade-
off between the privacy protection (R1) and model predic-
tion accuracy (R2).
For requirement R1, adding random noise to individual
Algorithm 1: Obfuscating individual samples
Input:
D: original dataset
d∗: the set of sensitive samples
Output:
D′: new artificial dataset
begin
D′ = D
for each (x∗, y∗) ∈ d∗ do
remove (x∗, y∗) from D′
(x∗′, y∗′) = ObfuscateIndividualSample(x∗, y∗)
add (x∗′, y∗′) to D′
end
return D′
end
function ObfuscateIndividualSample(x∗, y∗)
x∗′ = x∗ + Noise(x∗)
y∗′ = y∗
return (x∗′, y∗′)
end
samples can reduce the information leakage about these sam-
ples. Consider the case in which the adversary has the max-
imum capability, e.g., direct access to the training dataset
[34]. The adversary can retrieve the maximum and most
accurate information about the training data, i.e., the exact
values. After obfuscating the sensitive samples, the adver-
sary can at most obtain the samples with random noise. If
the strength of added noise (σ) is large enough and the ra-
tio of feature values involved (r) is large enough to cover
sensitive information, the adversary fail to get useful infor-
mation from his observation. For the threat model where
the adversary does not have direct access to the dataset,
he has to infer the property of the individual samples in-
directly from the model parameters or query outputs [33].
The models trained over the converted samples can only re-
flect the characteristics of noisy ones, and it is difficult for
the adversary to recover the correct information.
For requirement R2, machine learning models are robust
against appropriate random noise in the training set [40].
If the added noise is not biased, it can help prevent model
overfitting. However, adding too much noise to the training
dataset can reduce the accuracy of the target model. There
are two factors that affect the model accuracy when obfus-
cating the samples: the number of samples that need to be
obfuscated, and the amount of noise added to each sensi-
tive sample. If only a small number of samples inside the
training set need to be protected and obfuscated, then the
obfuscating operation does not affect the accuracy, as the
other samples can still contribute to generating a correct
model. When the number of sensitive samples is large, then
the amount of the noise becomes important in maintaining
the model accuracy. We need to select the appropriate noise
strength (σ in Gaussian noise), and the portion of involved
feature values (r) to hide sensitive information with negli-
gible accuracy degradation. Experiments in Sec. 4 demon-
strate that appropriate noise addition parameters can help
achieve both requirements R1 and R2.
3.2 Obfuscating Groups of Samples
3.2.1 Mechanism
Next we consider the protection of statistical properties
of training samples. The adversary is interested in a group
of samples g∗ that have common feature F∗. He expects to
retrieve the statistical information about the samples in this
group, P(g∗). The adversary may be interested in multiple
groups. We denote the group of these groups as G∗.
Similarly, the Obfuscate Module uses the Obfuscate-
GroupSample function to add random noise to each sensitive
group, as shown in Algorithm 2. Different from obfuscat-
ing individual samples which directly adds noise to every
sensitive sample, we can add some carefully-crafted training
samples into each group instead of modifying the original
samples. This operation can hide the statistical properties
of sensitive groups.
We introduce a new parameter r, denoting the ratio of new
samples added to a group in consideration. Then we calcu-
late the number of new samples required for this group. To
generate a new sample, we randomly pick an original one
from this group, convert the feature value into its negative,
and add small amount of noise. We assign this new fea-
ture value with a label so that this new sample satisfies the
group’s common feature F∗. For instance, for a face recogni-
tion task, the negative of a pixel value x of an image sample
is calculated as 255−x. If the adversary attempts to recon-
struct the looking of one person, then the common feature
of the target group is that all samples have the same label.
So we should assign the new samples with the same label.
Then we add this new sample into the group. Since the new
samples are the negative of original ones, the statistical val-
ues of the new group the adversary can infer will not reveal
the properties of original samples.
Algorithm 2: Obfuscating group samples
Input:
D: original dataset
G∗: A set of sensitive groups
r: ratio of added samples compared to original ones
Output:
D′: new artificial dataset
begin
D′ = D
for each g∗ ∈ G∗ do
remove g∗ from D′
g∗′ = ObfuscateGroupSample(g∗, r)
add g∗′ to D′
end
return D′
end
function ObfuscateGroupSample(g∗, r)
N = GetNumberSample(g∗) · r
g∗′ = g∗
for i = 1 ... N do
get a random sample (x∗, y∗) from g∗
x∗′ = Negative(x∗) + Noise(x∗)
select y∗′, s.t. (x∗′, y∗′) satisfies F∗
add (x∗′, y∗′) to g∗′
end
return g∗′
end
3.2.2 Analysis
Since the adversary does not focus on individual samples,
obfuscating individual samples (Sec. 3.1) cannot achieve re-
quirement R1: if each sample is injected with random noise,
the adversary can still obtain the statistical properties of
the samples, as the noise will be filtered when the adver-
sary calculates the statistical characteristics of the samples.
Instead, we add new samples whose properties are the op-
posite of the original ones. Then when the adversary tries
to infer the properties from the models, he will get the sta-
tistical results combining both the original samples and the
new samples. The injection of the new samples will hide the
properties of original samples.
For requirement R2, adding noisy synthetic data into the
training set does not affect model accuracy. It has been
shown that machine learning models, especially deep learn-
ing models, have a vast capacity and they can essentially
express any function to fit the given data [39]. When adding
new synthetic samples, the trained model from augmented
dataset is fitted to both the original samples and the new
ones [34]. So the model still has high quality on the original
data samples. Experiments in Sec. 4 confirm this argument.
4. CASE STUDIES
In this section, we evaluate the effects of the data ob-
fuscation in achieving privacy-preserving machine learning.
We consider four existing types of model privacy attacks:
model memorization attack [34] and membership inference
attack [33] target on the properties of individual samples;
model inversion attack [9] and model classification attack [5]
target on the statistical properties of groups of samples. For
each attack, we demonstrate the security evaluation as well
as the performance impact of obfuscating individual samples
or groups of samples.
4.1 Model Memorization Attack
4.1.1 Attack
Model memorization attack targets on individual samples:
the adversary is interested in some sensitive samples (x∗, y∗),
and wants to recover the exact feature values of these sam-
ples, i.e., P(x∗, y∗) = x∗. The adversary can be a malicious
cloud provider in a model training service, with full access
to the training set and models. He can steal the sensitive
samples, and encode the values into the model parameters
or outputs. Another malicious party can retrieve these sen-
sitive information from the model during model serving.
Song et al. [34] proposed several techniques for the ad-
versary to encode sensitive data into the models. (1) LSB
encoding: the adversary can encode the training dataset in
the least significant (lower) bits of the model parameters.
(2) Correlated value encoding: the adversary can gradually
encode information while training model parameters. For
instance, the adversary can add a malicious term to the loss
function which maximizes the correlation between the pa-
rameters and the data he wants to encode. (3) Sign encod-
ing: similar to correlated value encoding, the adversary can
use the sign of model parameters to interpret as bit strings,
e.g., positive parameters represent 1 and negative parame-
ters represent 0. (4) Abusing model capacity: different from
the above attacks, the adversary is assumed to have no ac-
cess to the model parameters. Then he can augment the
training dataset with synthetic inputs whose labels encode
the critical information. Then information is leaked via the
outputs of these added inputs.
Implementation . We use the same code and configuration
from [34] to reproduce the sign encoding attack, as it has a
relatively good performance in data encoding. The target
machine learning model is a 34-layer residual network over
CIFAR10 dataset [18]. CIFAR10 dataset contains 50,000
training images from 10 classes, e.g., airplane, automobile,
bird, etc. We pick one image for each class as the target
sample, as shown in Figure 3a. Note that the images in the
original CIFAR10 database are colored. Here we show them
as gray-scaled as the deep learning application first converts
these images to gray-scaled during input pre-proposing.
The adversary is able to encode around 400 images into
one model due to the limited number of model parameters.
Figure 3b shows the images recovered from the compromised
models. We can see that the adversary can accurately re-
cover most pixels of the images. He can easily identify the
objects and details from the recovered images.
4.1.2 Defense
Since the adversary attempts to recover the values of indi-
vidual images, we obfuscate each sensitive sample by adding
random noise to that sample. For each image, we randomly
select 1/3 of pixels and add Gaussian noise N (0, 75) to the
selected pixels.
Privacy. We first consider the defense effects in privacy-
preserving. Figure 3c shows the images the adversary recov-
ers via model memorization technique. Since we add random
noise to the images, the adversary only gets the noisy im-
ages. From these images, we observe that it is very difficult
for the adversary to identify the objects and their labels. It
is even harder to recognize the image details. So with data
obfuscation, even the adversary has control of the training
set, he cannot recover the clean and accurate data.
Accuracy. Next we consider the impact of adding noise to
the model prediction accuracy. Figure 4 shows the training
and validation accuracy versus training epochs. We consider
different ratios of sensitive samples that are obfuscated (r
in Algorithm 1). We can see that the training time is not
affected by the noise addition: each case reaches the maxi-
mum accuracy at almost the same time. However, there is a
tradeoff between validation accuracy and noise ratio. When
we add noise to 1/2 of the samples, the validation accuracy
decreases 2%. If we add noise to all of the samples, then the
validation accuracy drops by 5%, which is still acceptable.
Noise addition is more effective when there are not so many
sensitive samples to be protected.
4.2 Membership Inference Attack
4.2.1 Attack
Next we consider membership inference attack [33], which
also targets on the property of individual samples. For one
specific sample (x∗, y∗), the adversary wants to learn the
membership property: P(x∗, y∗) = I(x∗, y∗ ∈ D), i.e., if the
sample is used in the model training. The adversary does not
have direct access to the training dataset or trained model.
But he is able to use the trained model for prediction: he can
send any feature data to the model and obtain the confidence
score/probability that the input data belong to each class.
To infer the membership property, the adversary trains a
lot of shadow models using the same algorithm of the tar-
get model. For each shadow model, the adversary randomly
chooses some data samples to form a training set and a val-
idation set. The shadow model is trained over the train-
ing set. Then he feeds both the training feature data and
validation feature data into the shadow model and obtains
the corresponding results, i.e., probabilities of each class. If
the model is overfitted (this is an assumption in [33]), the
prediction results of training data and validation data are
(a) Target images
(b) Recovered images
(c) Recovered images with data obfuscation
Figure 3: Model memorization attack and the defense
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Figure 4: Prediction accuracy of machine learning models
in model memorization attack.
different. So the adversary can build a classifier, with the
prediction results of feature data as input, and whether the
data is from the training set (denoted as 1) or the valida-
tion set (denoted as 0) as the label. With this classifier, the
adversary sends the feature value of sensitive sample in con-
sideration to the target model and retrieves the prediction
result. Then he sends the prediction result to the classifier
and gets the conclusion whether the sensitive sample is a
member of the target model’s training set.
Implementation. We reproduce one membership infer-
ence attack from [33] with the same configuration and pa-
rameters: the target model is a convolutional neural network
over the CIFAR10 dataset. We select two sizes of the train-
ing set for the target and shadow models: 2,500 and 10,000.
The validation set has the same size as the training set. The
adversary runs 100 shadow models with different subsets of
training and validation samples. He uses logistic regression
to classify whether the sample is included in the training set
based on its prediction result.
The black lines (r = 0) in Figure 5 show the adversary’s
membership inference accuracy of samples in each class (x-
axis), with 10,000 and 2,500 training samples respectively.
We observe that the adversary can achieve high prediction
accuracies for different classes (80% ∼ 90%). Our repro-
duced results match the ones from [33]. To better illustrate
the membership inference attack effects, we show the confu-
sion matrices in Tables 1a (10,000 training samples) and 2a
(2,500 training samples). We can see that the adversary has
high confidence of identifying the samples that are included
in the training set. He has relatively high errors when the
samples are not in the training set. In general the F1 scores
are very high (0.86 and 0.89).
4.2.2 Defense
We use the same defense strategy of model memorization
attack to prevent the adversary from inferring the member-
ship of specific samples. We obfuscate each sensitive sam-
ples by injecting Gaussian noise. Then the target model is
trained over noisy samples. When the adversary conducts
the membership inference attack, his shadow models and
the classifier are generated over the clean samples. If a sen-
sitive sample is included in the target model’s training set,
the output of this sample from the target model will indi-
cate that this sample is not in the training set, as the target
model is trained with the noisy samples, not the clean ones.
Privacy. The red lines (r = 1) in Figure 5 show the ad-
versary’s inference accuracy after the training samples are
obfuscated. The base line is 50% (blue dash line), which is
the adversary’s random guessing accuracy. With data obfus-
cation, the adversary’s inference accuracy drops to 50% ∼
65%, close to random guessing. This is much lower than the
case without data obfuscation. Tables 1b and 2b shows the
confusion matrices with the defense: the adversary’s true
positives are decreased significantly, as he will mis-classify
the training samples as non-members of the training set.
Accuracy. We also need to consider the prediction accu-
racy of the target model with obfuscation. Figures 6 and
7 show the training and validation accuracy of the target
model with two training set sizes. We consider different
ratios (r = 0.25, 0.5, 1) of sensitive samples that are obfus-
cated. First we observe that in membership inference at-
tacks, the validation accuracy is much lower that the train-
ing accuracy, indicating that the target models are overfit-
ted. Shokri et al. [33] have the same conclusion and results,
as the difference between training and validation accuracy
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Figure 5: Accuracy of the membership inference attack.
gives the adversary the opportunity to judge if one sample
is from training set or validation set. Second, obfuscating
smaller ratios of samples will not affect the validation ac-
curacy. When all the samples are obfuscated (r = 1), the
validation accuracy degradation is within 5%, which is ac-
ceptable.
Table 1: Confusion matrix in membership inference attack
(10k training samples)
(a) r = 0: F1 = 0.86
Predicted: Predicted:
in out
Actual:
1 0
in
Actual:
0.31 0.69
out
(b) r = 1: F1 = 0.52
Predicted: Predicted:
in out
Actual:
0.44 0.56
in
Actual:
0.26 0.74
out
Table 2: Confusion matrix in membership inference attack
(2.5k training samples)
(a) r = 0: F1 = 0.89
Predicted: Predicted:
in out
Actual:
0.99 0.01
in
Actual:
0.23 0.77
out
(b) r = 1: F1 = 0.51
Predicted: Predicted:
in out
Actual:
0.41 0.59
in
Actual:
0.2 0.8
out
4.3 Model Inversion Attack
4.3.1 Attack
Model inversion attack is a type of model privacy attack
that can leak the statistical properties of samples with the
same label. For instance, Fredrikson et al. [9] designed a
model inversion attack, in which an adversary can recover
recognizable images of people’s faces. In this attack, the
adversary is interested in a group g∗ of samples with the
same feature, i.e., same label: F : yi = y∗. He wants to
recover the statistical property of these samples, i.e., the
average value: P(g∗) = avg(xi). The adversary retrieves the
statistical property from the model parameters and outputs.
Recovering such statistical property is an optimization
problem. For the above face recognition model inversion at-
tack, given a person’s name (label), the adversary’s goal is to
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Figure 6: Prediction accuracy of machine learning models
in membership inference attack (10k training samples).
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Figure 7: Prediction accuracy of machine learning models
in membership inference attack (2.5k training samples).
find the image, whose output from the model has the high-
est confidence score in that person’s class. The adversary
can use gradient descent method to solve this optimization
problem and recover the image of that person.
Implementation. We reproduce this attack from [9]. We
adopt the AT&T Face Database [31]. This database con-
tains 40 classes with each one has 10 gray-scaled images of
one person. We pick five persons from the database and
their original faces are shown in Figure 8a. Figure 8b shows
the corresponding images recovered by the adversary. We
can see the recovered images are very close to the original
ones and the adversary can easily identify the looking of one
person from the attack results.
4.3.2 Defense
We use Algorithm 2 to hide the statistical property of
sensitive samples. For the sensitive class, we add some new
samples to the training set. These samples are synthesized
as the negative values of the original images. So when the
adversary conducts the model inversion attack to obtain the
average value of the training samples in that class, the new
samples will hide the information of the original ones.
Privacy . Figures 8c – 8e show the recovered images after
we add different numbers of samples into the training set.
We use r to denote the ratio of the new samples to the
original ones. We can observe that the added noisy samples
can obscure the adversary’s observations. This obfuscation
operation is more effective when r is larger. When we add
(a) Target images
(b) Recovered images
(c) Recovered images with r = 0.25
(d) Recovered images with r = 0.5
(e) Recovered images with r = 1
Figure 8: Model inversion attack and the defense
the same number of new samples (r = 1) to the training set,
the adversary can hardly recognize the persons’ faces.
Accuracy. Figure 9 shows the training and validation ac-
curacies versus the number of training epochs with differ-
ent ratios of new added samples. We use r = 0 as the
baseline. We can see that with the new synthetic samples,
model training takes a little longer time to reach stable re-
sults. However, the model accuracy remains the same. This
confirms that adding new samples do not affect the model
accuracy of the old samples.
4.4 Model Classification Attack
4.4.1 Attack
Last, we consider model classification attacks that target
on the entire training set (F : xi, yi ∈ D) [5]. The adversary
wants to learn some attributes of the training set, P(g∗ =
D) = attr(xi). Ateniese et al. [5] gave two examples about
the training set attributes: inferring if the voice training
samples contain Indian accents in a speech recognition, and
inferring if Google web traffic is used in a network traffic
classification task. In this attack setting, the adversary is
assumed to have access to the model parameters, and infer
the attributes from these parameters.
Similar to membership inference attack, the adversary can
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Figure 9: Prediction accuracy of machine learning models
in model inversion attack.
build a classifier to predict the property. Specifically, the ad-
versary can first train a number of shadow models. Some of
the shadow models are trained over the training set with the
property P. These shadow models are labeled as 1. The rest
shadow models are trained over the training set without the
property. These shadow models are labeled as 0. Then the
adversary retrieves the parameters of each shadow model as
the features, and trains a new classifier over these features
and model labels. This classifier can map the model param-
eters to the model labels, i.e., whether the training set used
in this model has the property or not. So given the target
model, the adversary can retrieve its model parameters, feed
them into the classifier and predict if the training set of this
model has the property.
Implementation. Since detailed attack code, machine
learning algorithms and training dataset are not opensourced
in [5], we implement a new attack using the same technique.
We consider a handwritten digit classification task, which
uses LeNet neural network to classify digits “0” – “9” from
handwritten images. The adversary wants to learn the prop-
erty that if the training set is MNIST [20] or not. In our
experiment, the adversary trains 100 shadow models with
MNIST and 100 shadow models with another handwritten
image dataset, EMNIST [8]. For each shadow model, the ad-
versary retrieves all the trainable parameters in each neural
network layer (conv1/kernel, conv1/bias, conv2/kernel,
conv2/bias, fc1/kernel, fc1/bias, fc2/kernel, fc2/bias),
and calculates the mean and standard deviation of each pa-
rameter vector. This generates 16 values, representing the
feature of the shadow model. Then the adversary builds
a classifier using logistic regression to classify the MNIST
or non-MNIST shadow models from the feature values. To
measure the adversary’s classification accuracy, we train an-
other 100 models with MNIST and 100 models with EM-
NIST for validation. Table 3a shows the confusion matrix
of the classification. We can observe that the classifier has
a very good performance: only 1 model with non-MNIST is
mis-classified as EMNIST. The F1-score is 0.995.
4.4.2 Defense
Similar to model inversion attack, we can obfuscate the
entire training data by augmenting the dataset with syn-
thetic samples that are negative of original ones (Algorithm
2). With these faked samples, the statistical property of the
original dataset is hidden from the adversary’s classifier.
Table 3: Confusion matrix in model classification attack
(a) r = 0: F1 = 0.995
Predicted: Predicted:
MNIST non-MNIST
Actual:
0.99 0.01
MNIST
Actual:
0 1
non-MNIST
(b) r = 0.25: F1 = 0.246
Predicted: Predicted:
MNIST non-MNIST
Actual:
0.14 0.86
MNIST
Actual:
0 1
non-MNIST
(c) r = 0.5: F1 = 0.198
Predicted: Predicted:
MNIST non-MNIST
Actual:
0.11 0.89
MNIST
Actual:
0 1
non-MNIST
(d) r = 1: F1 = 0.077
Predicted: Predicted:
MNIST non-MNIST
Actual:
0.04 0.96
MNIST
Actual:
0 1
non-MNIST
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Figure 10: Prediction accuracy of machine learning models
in model classification attack.
Privacy. Tables 3b – 3d show the confusion matrices of the
adversary’s classifier when we add different ratios of syn-
thetic samples. We can observe that with the augmented
dataset, most MNIST models will be classified as non-MNIST,
and the defense is more effective when the added sample ra-
tio r increases. One interesting observation is that adding
new samples cannot make the adversary mis-classify the
non-MNIST model as MNIST model. This is because EM-
NIST is already an extended version of MNIST and contains
different types of handwritten digits. So adding noise to this
dataset makes it more extended and less like pure MNIST
data. But this is already effective in protecting the statisti-
cal properties of training set: when the adversary feeds the
target model into his classifier, he will always get the non-
MNIST label, and cannot tell if the training dataset of the
target model is MNIST or not.
Accuracy. Figure 10 shows the prediction accuracy of the
training set that is augmented and the validation set dur-
ing the training process. We observe that adding new noisy
samples to the training set has very small impact to the
training performance: when adding the same number of syn-
thetic samples as the original ones, it takes almost the same
amount of time to reach the same high accuracy.
5. RELATED WORK
5.1 Machine Learning Privacy Attacks
Different types of attacks were designed to breach the pri-
vacy of machine learning models or datasets.
Training data privacy. Training data is a popular target
for adversaries to steal during the model training or serving
phases. Ateniese et al. [5] proposed the model classifica-
tion attack: given a target model, an adversary is able to
extract some meaningful attributes of the training dataset.
The basic attack strategy is to train different shadow models
over datasets with different attributes. Then the adversary
can build a new classifier which can predict the dataset at-
tributes based on a model parameter as the feature.
Shokri et al. [33] proposed the membership inference at-
tacks to infer if one individual sample is included in the
training set of the target model. The attack technique is
similar to [5]: the adversary builds a quantity of shadow
models with different training datasets. He collects the pre-
diction results of the training samples and validation sam-
ples from each shadow model. Using the prediction results
as features and whether the sample is from training set or
validation set as the labels, the adversary can build a new
classifier to predict the membership given a sensitive sample
and a target model. Salem et al. [30] simplified the attacks
by relaxing some assumptions, e.g., using multiple shadow
models, knowledge of the target model structure and dataset
from the same distribution. Further studies show that mem-
bership inference attacks are possible even when the target
models are not overfitted [22,38]. Membership inference at-
tacks are also demonstrated in Generative Adversarial Net-
works [14,21]. Melis et al. [24] studies the inference attacks
in collaborative learning: the adversary can learn the mem-
bership of training data used by other participants, based
on the shared parameters in a distributed learning system.
Fredrikson et al. [10] proposed the model inversion at-
tacks: given a machine learning model, part of a sensitive
sample’s features and its label, the adversary is able to re-
cover the rest features of this sample. The adversary’s strat-
egy is to reverse the model training process: figuring out the
mapping from the output to input and predicting the input
feature that best matches the output label. An advanced
model inversion attack over deep neural network was pro-
posed in [9] which is able to inverse an image classification
model and recover an image given the corresponding label of
the image. Hitaj et al. [16] demonstrated the possibility of
model inversion attacks in collaborative learning even under
privacy-preserving protection. They adopted the Genera-
tive Adversary Network to actively recover the private data
samples used by other participants.
Song et al. [34] proposed model memorization attacks, in
which the adversary has direct access to the training data.
He attempts to encode the sensitive data into the model for a
receiver entity to retrieve them. Two cases were considered:
if the receiver entity has white-box access to the produced
model, then the adversary can directly encode the training
data into the model parameters; if the receiver party only
has black-box access to the model, then the adversary can
encode the training data into the outputs corresponded to
some specific inputs. In these ways, the private training
samples are leaked from model parameters or outputs.
Model privacy. In addition to the training set, adver-
saries may also be interested in the privacy of machine learn-
ing models. Trame`r et al. [35] proposed an attack to steal
machine learning models using prediction APIs. The basic
idea is that the adversary can generate a quantity of input
samples and feed them into the target model for prediction.
With the predicted outputs, the adversary can discover the
model that best represents the relationships between inputs
and outputs. Oh et al. [25] built metamodels to extract more
model details such as neural network architecture, which is
assumed public in [35]. Wang et al. [37] designed attacks
to steal the hyperparameter of the machine learning model.
A hyperparameter is used to balance the loss function and
regularization term in the objective function. The adversary
can obtain this value from the training set and model. The
hyperparameter can further help the adversary recover the
model parameters in a more efficient way.
In this paper we consider the privacy attacks on the train-
ing data, so model privacy is out of the scope, as models are
usually public and less private than the training dataset. We
design a generic methodology that can cover different types
of privacy attacks with different adversary’s capabilities, and
protect the privacy of different properties of training data.
5.2 Machine Learning Privacy Solutions
Enhancing the algorithms. One solution is to design se-
cure algorithms to prevent information leakage during model
training. Shokri and Shmatikov [32] proposed to use dis-
tributed training to protect the privacy of training data:
different participants can train the model with their data
locally and only upload the parameters with differential pri-
vacy noise, so training data will not be leaked to unautho-
rized parties. Hamm et al. [12] applied the same idea to
privacy machine learning in distributed IoT sensing systems.
Cao et al. [7] proposed a methodology to modify the training
algorithms to remove the effects of sensitive training samples
on the models. Ohrimenko et al. [26] proposed to use Intel
SGX-processors to protect the training tasks against priv-
ileged adversaries in the host environment. They also de-
signed data-oblivious machine learning algorithms that can
eliminate the data-dependent accesses. Similarly, Hunt et
al. [17] used Intel SGX to restrict the confidential train-
ing data from being leaked to adversaries. Abadi et al. [4]
applied differential privacy mechanism to design privacy-
preserving deep learning algorithm: they added noise dur-
ing the stochastic gradient descent process to eliminate the
model parameters’ dependency on the training dataset.
The above methodologies have some drawbacks. First, the
distributed privacy-preserving approach [32] can only pro-
tect the privacy of individual samples, but does not prevent
property inference attacks that apply to groups of train-
ing samples [24]. Second, for the above methods, we must
assume that the designed machine learning algorithms and
schemes can be correctly deployed in MLaaS. However, if
the adversary takes control of the machine learning plat-
form, he may not run the enhanced algorithms or systems
for privacy protection. Third, if the adversary has direct
access to the training data [34], then enhancing the training
process does not work. Fourth, for SGX-assistant solutions,
new hardware support is required, which makes it hard and
impractical to deploy. Besides, SGX solutions cannot be
applied to GPU architecture, which is now widely used in
machine learning tasks.
Enhancing the dataset. Enhancing the dataset has ad-
vantages over enhancing the training algorithms: even the
adversary has direct access to the training data or MLaaS
platform, he cannot get the sensitive data from the enhanced
set. Bost et al. [6] proposed to encrypt the dataset before
feeding them into the training algorithm. They designed ma-
chine learning operators which can operate on the encrypted
data. By doing so the adversary cannot get the data if he
does not have the encryption key. Although Homomorphic
encryption works but it is hard to be applied to any arbitrary
algorithm, and the performance is not efficient.
Triastcyn and Faltings [36] proposed to use Generative
Adversarial Network with differential-privacy to generate ar-
tificial data for deep learning. This idea is similar to our data
obfuscation methodology. However, their approach is lack
of strict differential privacy guarantees. The artificial data
generated by their approach is quite close to real samples,
with very minor differences in details. This is not enough for
privacy preservation. Besides, they cannot defeat inference
attacks against statistical properties, as the new samples
still keep the characteristics of original ones. In contrast, we
exploit the obfuscation operations on the training dataset to
hide the sensitive properties while maintaining the model’s
prediction accuracy. We empirically show that this solution
can defeat different types of data privacy attacks.
6. CONCLUSION
The fast development of machine learning techniques have
raised the security concern of data privacy. Past work have
shown that an adversary can easily steal properties about
the sensitive training samples in a MLaaS platform. We
propose a generic approach to protect the privacy of train-
ing data by obfuscating the training set. We consider the
protection of sensitive properties of individual samples, as
well as statistical properties of groups of samples. Our em-
pirical evaluations indicate this method can effective defeat
a wide range of existing privacy attacks without affecting
the training performance and prediction accuracy. Future
work include the optimization of adding noise to individual
samples by selecting minimal key feature values, and using
GAN to generate new dataset to hide statistical properties.
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